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THISpaper will deal with the use of National Bureau statistical in-
dicators for short-term forecasting. As the relationship of economic
theory to the National Bureau business-cycle research has frequently
been questioned, a few introductory comments will be offered on this
topic. The second section will deal with the use of this research for
identifying current developments, both at business-cycle peaks, and—
using the NBER findings concerning rates of change —duringother
phases of a cycle. The final section will be concerned with the problems
involved in using the indicators for forecasting, including the need to
be explicit about the time horizon and the expected degree of accuracy
to make the forecast useful to the intended audience.
The present set of statistical indicators grew out of earlier
work by Wesley Clair Mitchell and Arthur Burns. Recent work in
this area has been carried forward by Geoffrey Moore and Julius
Shiskin.'
The current set of statistical indicators for the United States is
the fourth complete reworking of the indicator selection: the first list
being compiled in 1938 by Wesley C. Mitchell and Arthur F. Burns;
the second and third lists by Geoffrey H. Moore in 1950 and 1960;
'The major references to the earlier work are Wesley Clair Mitchell, BusinessCycles,
Berkeley,University of California Press, 1913; Wesley Clair Mitchell, BusinessCycles
and Their Causes, Berkeley,University of California Press, 1941 (a reprint of Part III of
BusinessCycles,now available in paperback); Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell,
Measuring Business Cycles, New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946;
A. F. Burns and W. C. Mitchell, What Happens During Business Cycles: A Progress
Report, Cambridge, The Riverside Press for NBER, 1951; and Geoffrey H. Moore, ed.,
Business Cycle Indicators, Princeton, Princeton University Press for NBER, Vol. 1,
1961.
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and the fourth, in 1967, by Geoffrey H. Moore and Julius Shiskin.2 The
last two revisions reflect an enlarged program initiated at the Bureau
of the Census and extended to the National BUreau in 1957 at the re-
quest of Raymond J. Saulnier, Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers. Since October, 1961, the Bureau of the Census has pub-
lished a comprehensive monthly report with a wide range of series,
classified so as to point up their historical cyclical timing experience.
Since 1967, a further classification by economic process has been intro-
duced along the lines put forward in the latest Moore-Shiskin set of
indicators.
A number of factors contribute to the present desirability of re-
viewing the use of statistical indicators for forecasting. Currently,
statistical indicators are readily available in published form, and com-
puter programs permit low-cost adaptations to particular applications.
Second, there has been more study of the economic rationale of the
behavior of individual indicators, and greater discussion of their in-
teraction within a more complete system. Third, a number of studies
of forecasting records have been compiled, permitting an appraisal
of the statistical forecasting record of the National Bureau indicators
as compared with other techniques. Fourth, the group of indicators
selected on the basis of United States experience has been duplicated
for other countries, including Canada, Japan, and Australia, where they
are used for purposes similar to those for which the NBER indicators
have been employed in the United States.
THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE OF THE APPROACH
MOST economists would argue that there should be some basis in
economic theory for individual statistical series representing economic
processes. With this, I would concur. Historical conformity to business
cycles is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for confident use
2WesleyC. Mitchell and Arthur F. Burns, Statistical Indicators of Cyclical Revivals,
Bulletin 69, New York, NBER, 1938, reprinted in Geoffrey H. Moore, ed., Business
Cycle Indicators, Princeton University Press for NBER, 1961, Vol. 1, Chap. 6;Geoffrey
H. Moore, Statistical Indicators of Cyclical Revivals and Recessions, Occasional Paper
31, New York, NBER, 1950, reprinted in Business Cycle Indicators, Vol. 1, Chap. 7;FORECASTING WITH STATISTICAL INDICATORS•1161
byanalysts. An appreciation of the theoretical rationale increases
user confidence and gives a better indication of possible cautions and
modifications in applying the system to changed circumstances —either
within a country, or in other countries.
Some discussion, even brief, on this point seems desirable for
several reasons. For one, a significant number of economists have
reservations about the economic theory underlying National Bureau
work on business cycles and statistical indicators.3 However, the
early work by Mitchell grew out of a desire to test a variety of business-
cycle theories against the quantitative evidence of history in the major
industrialized countries. There was a stage in the business-cycle work
at the National Bureau when the assembly of basic data and its process-
ing for various purposes (seasonal adjustment, dating specific and refer-
ence cycles, measuring average cyclical experience, and so on) took a
large part of the Bureau's resources. Researchers became less explicit
about the underlying economic rationale. Fortunately, work since the
late 1950's has been much more explicit about theeconomic rationale;
some of the literature will be highlighted to bring this change to the
attention of the critics and sceptics.
Perhaps a personal note can provide a useful perspective on my
own views. For many years I was engaged in preparing short-term fore-
casts of the Canadian economy. The approach followed was eclectic,
using the national accounts as a framework for analysis and presenta-
tion, but also employing surveys of business plans and expectations,
as well as an econometric model initiated by L. R. Klein in 1947.
During the. mid-1950's, W. A. Beckett suggested the duplication of
Moore's 1950 list of indicators for Canada. The initial results of his
analysis were encouraging, and statistical indicators have been used
fairly consistently in Canada ever since. They were particularly helpful
at the 1957. business-cycle peak, and, for about fifteen years, have been
Geoffrey H. Moore, BusinessCycle Indicators, Vol,I, Chap. 3, "Leading and Confirming
Indicators of General Business Changes"; Julius Shiskin, Signalsof Recession an.d Re-
covery, OccasionalPaper 77, New York, NBER, 1961; and Geoffrey H. Moore and
Julius Shiskin, Indicatorsof Business Expansions and Contractions, NewYork,
bia University Press for NBER, 1967.
T. J. Koopmans, "Measurement Without Theory," Reviewof Economic Statistics,
August,1947, reprinted in R. A. Gordon and L. R. Klein,Readings in Business Cycles,
Homewood, illinois, Richard D. Irwin, 1965, PP. 186—203, and subsequent comments,
reply, and rejoinder by Rutledge Vining, pp. 204—23 1.1162•ECONOMETRICMODELS OF CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
of service in identifying changes in the early stages of cycles. As a
result of using the National Bureau indicators side by side with an
econometric model, I have become more impressed by the similarities
than by the differences in approach and operation.4
In commenting on the economic rationale of statistical indicators,
four areas will be touched on: (1) seasonal adjustment; (2) the rationale
for individual indicators; (3) the properties of a diffusion index; and
(4) the rationale of the complete system.
1. Seasonal adjustment.The need for seasonal adjustments is almost
taken for granted by most economists and statisticians. Electronic
computers have sharply reduced the costs of calculating moving aver-
ages, making working day and trading day adjustments, and making
both rough and final charts of the results. Consequently, a tremendous
range of seasonally adjusted series for the economy as a whole is now
available in many of the industrialized countries. These are widely
used by the professional analyst.
However, as one moves away from the national aggregates and
toward a finer level of industrial and regional detail, a number of things
happen. For one thing, the quantitative importance of seasonal and ir-
regular factors increases.5 Furthermore, seasonally adjusted data are
less readily available, and more difficult to prepare (partly because of
the greater extent of irregular factors and special considerations). In
the financial press there are frequent comparisons of current reports by
business firms with the same month or quarter of the previous year—
figures for orders, sales, profits, and other factors. If such year to year
comparisons are regarded as relating to the end of the comparison,
rather than to the middle of the year, this will contribute to belated
recognition of cyclical comparisons. Although more large companies
now use seasonally adjusted data to analyze the operating results for
their own firm and industry, many large companies and most small ones
rely on unadjusted data. Insofar as this is the case, it contributes to an
4These views on the indicators have been clarified by the writings of, and discussions
with, Geoffrey Moore, Julius Shiskin, W. A. Beckett, L. Lempert and Derek White.
D. J. Daly, "Seasonal Variations and Business Expectations," JournalofBusiness,
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accentuation of inventory fluctuations as the companies respond to
their reading of the surrounding economic climate. This procedure will
also contribute to the poor forecasting experience of surveys of short-
term business expectations.6
The National Bureau consistently tests for the prevalence of sea-
sonality as part of their procedure, and Julius Shiskin has played an
active role in the development and testing of computer methods of sea-
sonal adjustment.7
2. Individual indicators.It is impossible to deal here with the ra-
tionale of each indicator, as the 1966 list of indicators is comprised of
eighty-eight. However, reference to some studies covering this area
will further the discussion of the underlying theory and rationale. A
number of series are roughly coincident indicators (25 series in the
1966 list); these include all the main comprehensive series on employ-
ment and unemployment, production, income, consumption and trade,
prices and money and credit that any current analyst would use. A
number of the leaders are noncontroversial, relating to new invest-
ment commitments such as contract awards, new orders, housing
starts, and building permits. Many contemporary analysts—those with
a Keynesian background—would use these indicators in conjunction
with surveys of capital expenditure plans in appraising the invest-
ment area.
Special studies have been made of a number of other individual
series or economic processes, almost always including some discus-
sion of the economic rationale for their behavior. Examples of such
studies are included in Part Two of Business Cycle Indicators, Volume
1, covering such topics as the diffusion of corporate profits, business
failures, new incorporations, new orders, average number of hours
worked, and the cyclical pattern of the variety of indicators relating
to the labor market.8 Note should be taken of the work of Milton Fried-
6Ibid., pp. 265—267.
Shiskin, ElectronicComputers and Business Indicators,Occasional Paper
57, New York, NBER, 1957; Julius Shiskin, SignalsofRecession and Recovery,
Occasional Paper 77, New York, NBER, 1961, and OECD, Seasonal Adjustment on
Electronic Computers, Paris, 1961.
8BusinessCycle Indicators, Vol. 1, Chapters 11 to 16, pp. 325—513.1164•ECONOMETRICMODELS OF CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
man and others on the influence of monetary factors and the rate of
change in the money supply as a leading indicator.9
3. Diffusion indexes.With the wide Variety of series used, based on
quite different units of measurement, a method of the indi-
vidual series be helpful, especially as some of the individual
serIes involved are irregular in their month to month movement. Two
methods have been developed for this purpose. One, developed his-
torically, was the diffusion index, which in its basic form is a simple
percentage expanding from one month to the next'° A further method
is to prepare "amplitude-adjusted" composIte indexes. These were first
developed in the early 1960's, and are now being published regularly."
A critIc of diffusion indexes provIded valuable light on their prop-
erties.'2 Broida, the economist in question, emphasized the problems
encountered In producing a dIffusion index from Current data, and
showed the similarIties between the rates of change of the index
of industrial production and a diffusion index of the twenty-six
seasonally adjusted industry group components. At a business-cycle
peak, the economy is subject to conflicting tendencies, as many in-
dustries showing declines as increases, and earlIer rates of increase in
the total have been On the other hand, the most rapId rates
of increase in the aggregates are associated wIth widespread increases
in the Individual components. Working empirically, Shiskln has tested
this with a wide range of components and aggregates, using a standard-
ized percentage rate of change. His charts give strong evidence of the
Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, AMOnetaky 1-listory of the tJ ited
States, /867—1960, Princeton,Princeton University Press forthe NBER,1963, Fried-
man and Schwartz, "Money and Business Cycles,"RewewofEconomics andStat,stics,
Feb,1963Supplement, Milton Friedman, "The Monetary Studies of the National
Bureau," National Bureau Annual Report, June, 1964, 7—25, and
Milton "A Theoretical Framework for Monetary Analysis," JOUrndi of
PoliticalEconomy,March, and other references
Onevariant of this is to prepare the diffusion indexes from sedes that
have been smoothed by moVing Another refinemeilt is tO prepare a distributiOn
of rates of change, ising the computer, but, tO my knowledge, this has flot been used in
practice to any significant extent,
11Julius Shiskin, Signals of Reces.sion andRecovery,Occasional Paper 77, New
York, NBER, 1961, Appendix A, and Julius Shiskin, "Reverse Trend Adjustment of
Leading Indicators," R E Stat, Feb, 1967 Since November, 1968, these have been
published in the expanded publicatioh Business Conditions Digest
ArthurBroida5 Indexes," The AmthCah Statistician, June,FORECASTING WITH STATISTICAL INDICATORS.' 1165
relationshipsbetween diffusion indexes and rates of change.'3 The
costs of preparing a simple diffusion index are very low, and many
points about the current situation can easily be clarified by doing so.
On many occasions of rapid expansion in certain series, a particular
analyst has suggested that the expansion was largely due to some
special industry (which was admittedly increasing rapidly), while a
diffusion index would indicate that the expansion was both more wide-
spread and more deep-seated. The improved understanding of the re-
lationship between aggregates and diffusion indexes, and the low cost
of preparing the latter, should reduce the possibility of future misin-
terpretations.
4. The complete system.It seems to me that there are three essential
elements in the National Bureau system of indicators, catching key
elements of both contemporary business-cycle theory and the real
world; namely, the key role of profits in business decision-making, the
importance of lags in response, and the role of uncertainty. These are
the central aspects of the indicators. The broader historical study of
business cycles on which they are based, and some of the character of
the work, will be suggested for each point in turn.
Mitchell put the importance of profits in business decision-making
in. a central position.
Since the quest of money profits by business enterprises is the con-
trolling factor among the economic activities of men who live in a
money economy,, the whole discussion must center about the pros-
pects of profits. On occasion, indeed this central interest is eclipsed
by a yet more vital issue —theavoidance of bankruptcy. But to
make profits and to avoid bankruptcy are merely two sides of a
single issue—one side concerns the well-being of business enter-
prises under ordinary circumstances, the other side concerns the
life or death of the same enterprises under circumstances of acute
strain.
Whatever affects profits and solvency, then, comes within the
sweep of the analysis. And we already know the factors of chief
significance: the prices that constitute business receipts and the
prices that constitute business expenses, the volume of sales af-
Shiskin,Signals of Recession and Recovery, Appendix A: "Technical Notes on
Amplitude-Adjusted General Indexes, Adjusted Rates of Change, and Diffusion In-
dexes," pp. 123—137.1166•ECONOMETRICMODELS OF CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
fected at the prevailing margins of profit, the need of having cur-
rency to make payments and of obtaining loans in adequate amount
from banks and investors. But to know what these factors are, and
even to know what fluctuations they undergo in severalty, is only
half the battle. The other and the harder half is to follow the inter-
actions of these factors through all the permutations that brighten
or darken the prospects of profits and make easy or difficult the
maintenance of solvency.'4
This is also quite explicit in the 1913 comments:
The preceding theory of business cycles is concerned mainly with
the pecuniary phases of economic activity. The processes de-
scribed relate to changes in prices, investments, margins of profit,
market capitalization of business enterprises, credits, the mainte-
nance of solvency, and the like—all relating to the making of
money, rather than to the making of goods or to the satisfaction of
wants. Only two nonpecuniary factors command much attention —
changesin the physical volume of trade and in the efficiency of
labor —andeven these two are treated with reference to their bear-
ing upon present and prospective profits.'5
Prices, costs, and profits play an important part in the 1966 list of
indicators, while Hultgren and Zarnowitz did a number of studies in
this area during the 1950's.
The importance of lags is the second key feature in the complete
system of indicators. Differences in the timing of various economic
processes in relation to the business cycle are central to the set of sta-
tistical indicators. Lags reflect the tendency for decisions and develop-
ments in one economic process to influence the development and rate
of change in another sector, or process, at a later period. Illustrations
of these differences in timing can be seen in the accompanying Table
1, taken from Arthur Bums' introduction to W. C. Mitchell's What
Happens During Business Cycles: A Progress Report. This table
graphically summarizes typical response-patterns of various statistical
indicators over the course of business cycles. Another illustration is
provided in Chart 1, which shows a variety of composite indicators
with different cyclical-timing patterns.
14WesleyClair Mitchell, Business Cycles and Their Causes, Preface, pp. xi and xii.
15Ibid.,p. 187.FORECASTING WITH STATISTICAL INDICATORS•1167
Inlight of the emphasis that Mitchell put on profits and the inter-
relationships with prices and costs, Table 2 is especially interesting.
The comprehensive wholesale price indexes move roughly in time with
the business cycle. On the other hand, sensitive commodity prices
typically move in advance of that cycle. The series on profits and profit
margins also move early, while, contrariwise, unit labor costs (reflect-
ing changes in labor earnings arid output per unit of labor input) and
some interest rates move late. These characteristic changes can be
used to illustrate the later stages of an expansion. Upward movements
in costs accelerate and become more widespread at this stage; simul-
taneously, slackening in the rate of increase in demand in a growing
number of firms and industries leads to a wide-scale erosion of profit
margins. The declines in profits eventually lead to caution on inventory
policy and investment decisions, but this process can begin while in-
creases in wage rates, prices, and interest rates are still under way.16
A third element is the role of uncertainty. This is reflected in the
emphasis on the absence of complete conformity to business cycles on
the part of a number of statistical indicators, and on variations between
cycles as to duration and amplitude. This is somewhat analogous to
the random disturbances in the individual structural equations and in
the complete system of an econometric model.
Milton Friedman summarized the significance of uncertainty and
timing lags in Mitchell's work as follows:
At the very broadest level of generality, persistent
fluctuations in economic activity can occur only in a world charac-
terized by both uncertainty (in the sense of unpredictable change)
and lags in response (in the sens& of different timing of reL
sponse). ...Lagsin response are the central elements in theories
of this type....Thelags in response must be pervasive, they
must operate on a broad range of activities, these activities must
be linked to one another and to the remainder of the system, and
the whole must display consistent, though not identical responses
in successive cycles.17
16D.J. Daly, "Cyclical Movements in Prices and Costs," paper given to the Ottawa
Chapter of the Canadian Political Science Association, November 19, 1958.
MiltonFriedman, "The Economic Theorist" in Arthur F. Burns, Wesley Clair
Mitchell: The Economic Scientist, New York, National Bureau of Economic Research,
1952, pp. 259—260.TABLE











Series Third ThirdThird Peak
Bonds sold, N.Y. Stock
Exchange +
R.R. bond prices + +
Businessfailures;liabilities,
mv. + + +
Common stock prices + + +
Shares sold, N.Y. Stock
Exchange + + +
Corporate security issues + + +
Construction contracts, value + + +.
Deposits activity + + +
Bank clearings or debits,
N.Y.C. + + +
Incorporations, no. + + + +
Bank clearings or debits,
outside N.Y.C. + + + +
Bank clearings or debits, total + + + +
Imports, value + + + ±
Industrial production, total + + + +
Fuel & electricity
production + + + +
Pig iron production + + + +
R.R. Freight ton miles + + + +
Factory employment + + + +
Factory payrolls + + + +
Income payments, total + + + +
Corporate profits + + + +
Business failures, no., mv. + + + +
Department store sales,
deflated + + + +
Wholesale trade sales, value + ± + +
Wholesale commodity prices + + + +
R.R. bond yields + +
NOTE: A plus denotes rise; a minus denotes fall. The two series on failures
are inverted here. Bond prices are treated as the inverted replica of bond yields.
SOURCE: A. F. Burns and W. C. Mitchell, Whcu Happens During Business
S1






















Third Third ThirdTroughCovered Rise Fall
— ± + 14 86 79
+ + + 19 65 74
+ + 14 86 100
— + 16 94 82
+ 16 94 88
+ 8 100 75
+ 7 86 75
+ 16 94 88
+ 18 100 89
+ 19 84 80
+ 14 100 79
+ 14 100 93
+ 16 94 75









— 4 100 75
3 100 100
— 11 82 91
+ 19 74 65
Cycles: A Progress Report, Studies in Business Cycles, No. 5. Cambridge,
Mass., The Riverside Press, 1951. Data presented here is derived from Table
31, Section A.CHART 1
Composite Indexes of Leading, Coincident, and Lagging Indicators
























NOTE:Numbers entered with arrows indicate months of lead (—)orlag (+)
from business-cycle peak and trough dates at top of chart. Shaded areas are
business-cycle contractions; white areas are expansions.
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TABLE 2







Classification and Number of Series Unadjusted MCD Span
Sensitive commodity price indexes (1) —2 .—2
Profits and profit margins (4) —5 —4
Comprehensive wholesale price indexes(2) 0 0
Unit labor costs (2) +8 +8
Interest rates on business loans and
mortgages (4) +4 +5
SOURCE: Moore and Shiskin, Indicators of Business Expansions and
Contractions, Appendix E, p. 112.
IDENTIFYING CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN CONSIDERING the use of statistical indicators for analysis of the
current economic situation and the short-term economic outlook, it
is important to determine how much one can realistically expect.
Geoffrey Moore, who has been a leading developer and user of this
framework for the last two decades, describes the results of the use of
indicators in the 195 3—54 and 1957—58 recessions and revivals in this
way:
They do not mean that one can get much advance notice that a
general business contraction is beginning or is coming to an end.
They do help one to recognize these events at about the time they
occur: Even then there is some risk of error.'8
This may seem like a modest claim, but appraisals of forecasting
accuracy suggest that contemporaneous recognition of a peak or a
Moore,BusinessCycle Indicators, Vol.1,p. 79.FORECASTING WITH STATISTICAL INDICATORS•1173
trough would be a more effective development than most forecasters
have achieved in the past.'°
The 1966 list of statistical indicators for the United States has
been selected on the basis of past experience (some of it going back
to well before World War II). Its use on a current basis assumes a
significant continuity between past experience and current perform-
ance, an assumption which is also accepted in econometric forecasting
models. The individual indicators, classified by economic process, are
summarized by broad timing relationships in the form of diffusion
indexes and composite indexes (both with and without reverse trend
adjustment). The individual leaders, and the summaries on which they
are based, give early warning of developing changes in the coincident
indicators. Unfortunately, the length of the leads is variable, and the
month to month movements are irregular. It would be inappropriate to
use the leaders and their summary measures in isolation, for the
changes in the laggers (partly reflecting the• emphasis on prices and
costs) may have an intimate causal connection with changes in the
leaders.2° However, although recent data indicate a continuation of
the historical timing relationships,the postwar forecasting of turning
points provided by two seryices using statistical indicators has not
been outstanding.2'
Making a judgment—even a tentative one—on the current state
of the business cycle is an important step. Any judgment about the
present immediately implies what to watch for in the months and
quarters ahead. A study of emerging developments in relation to an
earlier tentative cyclical dating enables the confirmation of earlier
views, and suggests the sensitive areas of change in direction or vigor
that may be expected to take place.
19VictorZarnowitz, An Appraisal of Short-Term Economic Forecasts, New York,
Columbia University Press for the NBER, 1967; Rendigs Fels and C. Elton Hinshaw,
Forecasting andRecognizingTurning Points, New York, Columbia University Press
for the NBER, 1968; and Geoffrey H. Moore, "Forecasting Short-Term Economic
Change," Journal of the American Statistical Association, March, 1969, PP. 1—22.
See also the earlier appraisals of business expectations surveys by Hultgren, Ferber,
Mocligliani, Hastey and Hartle referred to in Daly, "Seasonal Variations and Business
Expectations."
20GeoffreyH. Moore, "Generating Leading Indicators from Lagging Indicators,"
Western Economic Journal, June, 1969, pp. 137—144 and Part 4 of the last section on
"The Complete System."
21Forecastingand Recognizing Turning Points, pp. 39—45.1174•ECONOMETRICMODELS OF CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
Although the forecasting and current dating of cyclical turning
points are important, the question of the duration and extent of current
change is also critical. In myopinion this is not always given sufficient
attention in forecasting appraisals.
Three features of the historical business-cycle experience are to
be borne in mind in short-term forecasting. One of them is that,
historically, the sharpest rates of increase in the coincident indicators
typically occur in the early stages of expansions.22 However, this
evidence has apparently not been incorporated into the forecasts
appraised by Zarnowitz; most of them tend to underestimate rates of
increase in the first year of expansions.23 A. considerable improvement
in forecasting the early stage of an expansion would occur if the
implications of the historical experience were more definitely recog-
nized. The extent of idle resources available at the start of an expansion
might provide some impression of the potential increase. Though it is
sometimes hard to visualize the areas of final demand, which might
provide the source of demand strength at this stage of the cycle, a
swing in inventory investment is usually a criticalfactor. This volatile
segment of demand is notoriously difficult to forecast on a short-term
basis.
A second historical phenomenon during business cycles relating
to rates of change is the fact that the expansion typically undergoes a
sharp but general period of retardation in the middle stages of expan-
sions.24 Since World War II such retardations have occurred in 1951,
1956 and 1966—67. During each of these periods the leading indicators
showed weakness, and there were clear retardations in the rates of
increase in the major coincident aggregates. However, the weakening
was insufficient to be regarded as a period of cyclical decline for the
economy as a whole.
It is a matter of judgment whether a particular decline in the
leaders reflects a pause in the vigor and extent of the expansion,
or a cyclical recession. These retardations appear to be related to the
subcycles in inventory investment explored by Ruth Mack.25 A more
22WhatHappens During Business Cycles, Table 31, pp. 260—261, and p. 302.
23An Appraisal of Short-Term Economic Forecasts, pp. 5—6, 27—29, and 51.
24WhatHappens During Business Cycles, Table 31, pp. 260—261, and p. 302.
25Consumptionand Business Fluctuations: A Case Study of the Shoe, Leather,
Hide Sequence, New York, NBER, 1956.FORECASTING WITH STATISTICAL INDICATORS•1175
generalawareness of the historic tendency for a business-cycle
expansion to undergo a significant retardation would alert analysts of
the current economic situation to the possibility, encouraging an initial
caution in regarding every period of weakness in the leaders as an
indicator of cyclical weakness.
The indicators can also be helpful in appraising, during its early
stages, whether a recession will be mild or severe. Moore summarized
the use of the leaders for early appraisal in this way:
We find that even as early as the third month after the peak the
declines in many of the leading series begin to differentiate the
more severe from the less severe recessions. ... Asa group, the
leaders provide a more reliable indication of severity than the
aggregates during the first six or possibly nine months of reces-
s ion 26
In a subsequent addendum Moore evaluated his experiment like
this:
It should be observed that this experiment in measuring the
severity of a recession while it was in progress did not pinpoint
the magnitude of the decline. At best, it defined a broad range
within which it might fall. Moreover, it was only partly successful
in indicating the duration of the period of "depressed activity,"
i.e., the interval from the business cycle peak to the time when
activity regains its pre-recession level.27
Derek White has found some evidence that the rates of increase
in costs and prices in the twelve months preceding a cyclical peak
bear some relationship to the subsequent severity of a recession. Other
studies, likewise, have explored rates of change and cyclical magni-
tudes.28
26Geoffrey H. Moore, "Measuring Recessions," Journal of the American Statistical
Association, June, 1958 (NBER Occasional Paper 61), reprinted in Business Cycle
Indicators, Vol. 1, p. 138.
27BusinessCycle Indicators, pp. 160—161.
Lun Cheng, "Statistical Indicators and Cyclical Amplitudes," presented at
the Midwest Economics Association, Des Moines, Iowa, April 19, 1958, and Pao Lun
Cheng and Leonard H. Lempert, "Rates of Change and Cyclical Magnitude," Pro-
ceedings of the Business and Economics Statistics Section, American Statistical
Association, Dec. 1958, pp. 142—149.1176 ECONOMETRIC MODELS OF CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
APPLICATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES
MOST of the work with statistical indicators has been done in the
United States. In addition, the National Bureau lists of indicators
have been adopted in a number of other industrialized countries.
They were duplicated in the Economics Branch of the Department of
Trade and Commerce in the mid-1950's, and subsequently have been
used in several government agencies, by the Economic Council of
Canada, and by economic consultants in the United States and Canada.
Some of the main conclusions from the Canadian experience
are relevant here:
In general, the same activities that lead reference cycle turning
points in the United States also lead in Canada and by about the
same margin; the same general correspondence applies to roughly
coincident and lagging indicators.
Diffusion indexes based on Canadian statistical indicators trace
out a time path very similar to those for the United States: these
indexes lead the reference cycle turning points.
Finally, the indicators and diffusion indexes have proved
extremely helpful in current economic analysis and in short-
term forecasting.29
More than ten years of experience with the use of these statistical
indicators in Canada have transpired since this appraisal was written,
fully confirming the initial conclusions. These business-cycle indicators
have not been used in isolation by government analysts but along with
an econometric macro model, surveys of capital-spending plans,
employment expectations by firms, and a review of economic develop-
ments in the United States and the main European economies, which
reflects the importance of international factors in Canadian economic
developments.30
The Economic Planning Agency in Japan produces a regular
publication Business Cycle Indicators, containing reference cycle
W. A. Beckett, "Indicators of Cyclical Recessions and Revivals in Canada," in
Business Cycle Indicators, Vol. 1, pp. 295 and 297.
OECD,Techniques of Economic Forecasting, Chapter II, "Canada: Short-Term



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.1178•ECONOMETRIC MODELS OF CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
be evaluated in relation to user needs. Though for some purposes an
identification of changes in the economy at about the time they occur
may be quite sufficient, for a number of important purposes a longer
forecast seems necessary. Several examples will illustrate this.
Business firms must make decisions about major capital expan-
sions. These might be made more rationally in the light of develop-
ments in the economy as a whole and for the particular industry and
products over a span of years ahead, instead of from primarily shorter-
term developments. Cyclical indicators were not designed to meet
these areas of interest, and they must be tackled with other tools if
they are to be met at all.
It is often suggested that ano.ther important objective for cyclical
indicators should be assistance in the use of monetary and fiscal policy
for economic stabilization. If the aim of monetary and fiscal policy
was to be the moderation, or offsetting, of cyclical changes in the
economy, significant practical problems would be encountered, owing
to the length of the lags in the operation of policy relative to the dura-
tion of past cyclical changes —particularlythe short duration of reces-
sions. A brief summary of some of the implications of other work may
be helpful at this point.
Monetary policy can be adjusted flexibly once the need to adjust
is recognized. However, it takes quite a long time for such changes
to have an effect on expenditure decisions as a result of the length
of the outside lag. The time required for business to initiate and modify
investment plans is comparatively long. On the fiscal side, the prolonged
discussions of proposed changes in tax rates in the United States
during the 1960's provide recent evidence of the timing problems in
this area. Changes in expenditures can also be slow, especially if they
require changes in legislation or significant change in organization
to bring them about. Once changes in government receipts and
expenditures have been brought about, they have a fairly rapid effect
on consumer expenditure but a decidedly slower effect on business
capital-spending. For countries in which international trade is im-
portant, changes in the exchange rate can have an important effect
on their competitive and trading position, and the length of the lags can
be very great. For example, the 1960—62 Canadian devaluation was
still having a significant stimulating effect on the exports of finished
manufactured products seven yearslater,while prices of manyFORECASTING WITH STATISTICAL INDICATORS•1179
manufacturedgoods in Canada had still not been adjusted upward
by the full amount of the devaluation. The length of these lags appears
great in relation to the typical duration of the postwar contractions
in North America (10.5 months) and expansions (35.5 months:
excluding the extended expansion beginning in
The need to mobilize political support is a further limitation on
the pursuit of a discretionary fiscal policy, especially in view of the
frequency of policy adjustment involved. If stabilization policies
were to be adjusted for each business-cycle turn, past North American
experience would suggest that shifts in the emphasis of stabilization
policies would be required about five times each decade! Whether the
public and the politicians who represent them place sufficient priority
on short-term stabilization to support policy adjustments with this
degree of frequency is questionable. Also, it may be questioned
whether such policy adjustments would be as necessary in the first
place if different fiscal and monetary strategies were pursued.
The evidence suggests that statistical indicators provide a basis
for recognizing changes at about the time they occur, while users
need forecasts for much longer periods in order to implement effective
stabilization policies. Zarnowitz summarizes the evidence for fore-
casting accuracy over various time spans in this fashion:
The evidence shows clearly that the average errors of short-term
forecasts increase as the span increases....Theprogression to
larger errors appears in all summary measures (means, standard
deviations, and root mean square errors) and in forecasts of
variables with quite different characteristics....Therecan be
no doubt that the predictions are considerably more accurate,
in absolute terms, over the next three months than over the next
six, and more accurate again over six months than over nine or
twelve.34
For a fuller discussion of the evidence, see John Kareken and Robert M. Solow,
"Lags in Monetary Policy," in StabilizationPolicies, EnglewoodCliffs, N.J.,
Hall, Inc., 1963; Conferenceon St abilizajion Policies, Ottawa,Queen's Printer for the
Economic Council of Canada, 1966; Derek A. White, BusinessCycles in Canada,
EconomicCouncil of Canada, Staff Study No. 17, Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1966;
D. J. Daly and Derek A. White, "Economic Indicators in the 1960's," Proceedingsof
the Business and Economics Statistics Section, American Statistical Association,
Aug.,1967, pp. 64—75;andD. J. Daly, "ThePost-War Persistence of the Business
Cycle in Canada," in Martin Bronfenbrenner, ed., Isthe Business Cycle Obsolete?
NewYork, John Wiley & Sons, 1969, pp. 45—65.
Zarnowitz, op.cit., p. 60.1180•ECONOMETRICMODELS QF CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
In the light of the gap between forecasting needs and attainabili-
ties, there are only four options open:
(a) to improve the accuracy of forecasts a number of quarters
ahead;
(b)tosignificantly modify the political and administrative con-
straints on policy flexibility;
(c)toeliminate or modify the causes of inventory swings; or
(d)tolower the objectives of short-term stabilization.
Either of the first two options are likely to be difficult to achieve.
2. Cycles, potential output and growth.Business cycle indicators
have been selected and used to assist in the current appraisal of
business cycles, as defined by the National Bureau. Though the
indicators are extremely helpful for that purpose, it has never been
claimed—and it would be unrealistic to expect—that this approach can
meet the necessary conditions fOr a variety of other analytical or policy
purposes. Two examples will illustrate this point.
The Council of Economic Advisers introduced the notion of
potential output and the gap between actual and potential output in
President Kennedy's administration, earlyin the1960's.35 Even
should the economy undergo a business-cycle expansion, there can
still be an undesirably large gap between actual and potential output
from the economic, social, and political points of view. The statistical
indicators cannot throw much light on the size of the gap (although they
can be helpful in indicating whether the gap is likely to narrow or widen
in the period immediately ahead), nor can the estimates of the size of
the gap throw much light on the emerging business cycle. It seems to
me that both .types of data and analysis are necessary components of
a comprehensive view of the current economic situation.36 Quarterly
estimates of actual and potential output and the size of the gap (in
real terms) are now published regularly in Business Conditions Digest.
35Economic Report of the President, January 1962, Washington, G.P.O., 1962,
pp.49—56, and ArthurJ. Okun,"PotentialGNP: Its Measurement and Significance,"
Proceedings of the Business and Economics Statistics Section of the American Statis-
tical Association, 1962.
I, personally, would regard Arthur Burns' initial critical comments on the estimates
of the size of the gap as an extreme position. Arthur F. Burns, "A Second Look at the
Council's Economic Theory;" The Morgan Guaranty Survey, August, 1961.FORECASTING WITH STATISTICAL INDICATORS•1181
TheEconomic Council of Canada has made estimates of actual and
potential output in the course of its work, and has used its knowledge
of differing timing relations over the cycle in analyzing the performance
of the economy.
It should be noted that the high underlying rates of growth in
potential output in the North American and European economies have
probably had an influence on the duration and extent of the postwar
expansions and on the short, mild recessions. In the United States
and Canada, the underlying rate of growth in the labor force has been
well in excess of historical experience. In most of the individual
European economies, and in Japan, the increases in output have been
well in excess of the rates of growth in employment and other inputs
experienced historically in those countries, or currently prevailing
in North America.37 However, most observers would agree that the
business cycle is not as yet obsolete.38
At a more technical level, it should be noted that any weakening in
demand can be reflected in an emerging gap between actual and poten-
tial output and in increasing unemployment—even though the major
production aggregates may still be increasing (although at a slower
rate). Some reappraisal of the earlier methods of dating cycles may be
appropriate in dealing with this possibility.
3. The problem of uncertainty.Earlier on, the role of uncertainty in
the theory and application of cyclical indicators has been under dis-
cussion. At.this stage the problem of uncertainty in using the indicators
for current economic analysis will be summarized under three headings:
(a) variations in conformity and timing;
(b) retardations during expansions; and
(c) the influence of the nonconformers.
EdwardF. Denison, assisted by Jean.Pierre Poullier, Why GrowthRatesDiffer—
Postwar Experience in Nine Western Countries, Washington, The .Brookings Institu-
tion, 1967, and D. J. Daly, "Why Growth Rates Differ: A Summary and Appraisal,"
Revieit' of Income and Wealth, March, 1968, pp. 75—93.
38MartinJ. Bronfenbreriner, ed., op. cit., p. 507. This volume is based on a conference
sponsored by the SSRC Committee on Economic Stability. Geoffrey Moore has con-
sidered this in relation to the application of the NBER methods to the rapidly growing
European economies. Milton Friedman has modified the application of methods to
the rate of change in the money supply by dating the rate of change at the end of a period
reflecting closely similar changes. This permits the use of the indicators during periods
of prolonged rapid growth, a point raised by Dr. Firestone in his comments.1182 ECONOMETRICMODELS OF CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
(a) Variations in conformity and timing.The historical work on busi-
ness cycles and the discussion of business cycle indicators emphasize
the variations in historical experience of the. conformity, and timing
patterns of individual statistical indicators.39 There is some variation
in the conformity and timing scores of many of the indicators, especially
among the leading and lagging series. These are the ones that would be
of most help in giving early warning signals of emergent changes.
(b)Retardarionsduring expansions.Some discussion of the typical
retardation during expansions was provided earlier. This phenomenon
has recurred during 1951, 1956, 1962, and 1966—67, during postwar
expansions, and advance warnings of these retardations are typically
provided by the leading indicators and their summary measurement.
The occurrence of "false signals" in the leaders has been considered
in previous appraisals of the forecasting possibilities in the leading
indicators.40
(c) The influence of the nonconformers.Of the 794 monthly and
quarterly series for the United States used by Mitchell in What Hap-
pens During Business Cycles, 85 were classified as irregular in cyclical
timing. Almost half of these represent output, prices, inventories, or
international trade in agricultural products and foods. Others represent
government construction contracts, sticky prices (railway rates, street-
car fares, certain wage rate and earnings data, and so forth).41 It is
of some interest that the behavior of these irregular economic processes
sometimes offsets, and sometimes intensifies, the cyclical fluctuations
Burnsand Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles, Chapter II on "Cyclical Changes
in Cyclical Behavior"; Wesley C. Mitchell, What Happens During Business Cycles,
Chapter 8, "Cycle-by-Cycle Variability in Cyclical Behavior"; and Moore and Shiskin,
Indicators of Business Expansions and Contractions. "Appendix D, Conformity and
Timing Scores for illustrate this, without attempting complete documentation.
4°SydneyS. Alexander, "Rate of Change Approaches to Forecasting —Diffusion
Indexes and First Differences," Economic Journal,June, 1958,pp. 288—30 1; Alexander
Sachs, "The Cyclical Indicator Approach," The Conference Board Business Record,
June, 1955, pp. 7—16; Arthur M. Okun, "On the Appraisal of Cyclical Turning Point
Predictors," Journal of Business, April, 1960, pp. 10 1—120.
"WhatHappens During Business Cycles, pp. 56—60. Some series closely related to
those classed as irregular on the basis of their historical timing relation are carried
regularly in Business Conditions Digest in the section "Other Key Indicators."FORECASTING WITH STATISTICAL INDICATORS•1183
occurring in the rest of the economy. For example, during severe
business-cycle depressions, these nonconformers also decline.
These three important types of variability in historical experience
illustrate the role of uncertainty in the economy. Some of these em-
pirical results may reflect imperfections in the data or in the methods
of seasonal adjustment, and there is undoubtedly room for further
improvement in the basic data. However, a significant part of the mate-
rial is a reflection of developments in the real world.
Similar indications of the importance of uncertainty in the real
world are to be found in the major econometric models for the United
States and Canada. The size of the error terms in individual structural
and reduced-form equations, and the errors of the complete system of
equations, reflect this. The difficulties in developing satisfactory struc-
tural and predictive equations for such cyclically sensitive series as
corporation profits and inventory change are well recognized. Further-
more, the list of series treated as exogenous in some of the main
econometric models is very similar to that of series classified as
conformers in the National Bureau presentation. In one appraisal of
the forecasting record of the Canadian econometric model, it was
suggested that the problems involved in forecasting the exogenous
variables were a key factor in the poor results for that year.42 Many
years of using that model would confirm this conclusion for other years.
The forecasting record of a variety of approaches suggests that
the problem of uncertainty about the future is not peculiar to those
using historical experience and economic theory as a basis of predic-
tion.
If this view regarding statistical indicators and other approaches to
short-term forecasting is essentially correct, there are important im-
plications for attempts to use economic forecasts as a basis for dis-
cretionary monetary and fiscal policy aimed at the task of economic
stabilization.
42T. M. Brown, "A Forecast Determination of National Product, Employment and
Pnce Level in Canada from an Econometric Model," in ModelsofIncome Determina-




Don Daly has presented us with a useful and comprehensive
review of the uses to which the National Bureau of Economic Research
statistical indicators —andsimilar data in other countries —canbe put
for short-term forecasting purposes. He has drawn on some twenty
years of experience as a successful forecaster in the service of the
Government of Canada and as a researcher in the field of economic
behavior, seeking the best means of measuring and anticipating
economic change.
His presentation is well documented and his conclusions are
couched in careful academic terms. Hence, the main points a commen-
tator can put forward, beside acknowledging the professional quality
of the report, are not so much in reference to what he says but to what
he omits to say. In choosing this form of comment, the limitations of
a short paper have been carefully considered.
The comments cover five points. The first is of a general nature
and deals with the application of indicators to business-cycle and
economic-growth analysis. The next three items relate to specific
matters raised in the paper, including the role of judgment, seasonal
adjustments, and the application to other countries. The last item deals
with Daly's conclusions.
APPLICATION TO BUSINESS CYCLE AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH ANALYSIS
The primary objective of statistical indicator techniques, the
leaders, the concurrent, and the lagging series, is to facilitate the recog-
nition of economic change, if possible, in both direction and extent of
general economic activity. The use of indicators as a forecasting de-
vice is an outgrowth of business-cycle analysis. Daly refers to the work.
of Mitchell, Burns, Moore, and Shiskin, among others, as pioneers in
the work of selecting and testing relevant statistical series, grouping
them in a statistically meaningful way so that their proven behaviorFORECASTING WITH STATISTICAL INDICATORS•1185
over a long period of time might be used to foreshadow upward or
downward changes in economic activity.
Daly does not take sides on the issue of whether business-cycle
examination is, or is not, an outdated form of economic analysis. But
he does suggest that statistical indicators, with all their limitations, have
a forecasting a change in economic activity. He refers to the
use of diffusion indexes as a "method of combining the individual series
•..[to]be helpful" (p. 1 164).1
If one examines the variety of series that make up a diffusiOn
index based on leaders, one finds a cross-section of statistical series:
those reflecting economic flows, e.g., housing starts and GNP inventory
change; those reflecting working conditions, e.g., average hours worked
and layoff rate in manufacturing; those reflecting entrepreneurial
itiative or lack of business success, e.g., net new enterprises established
or failure liabilities; and those reflecting the working of the market
system—industrial-material prices, and common-stock prices. A dif-
•fusion index based on such a conglomerate of statistical series "relates
to 'indicators of activity' rather than to an economically significant
total.... Obviously,these indicators all pertain to general economic
conditions, but do not comprise an economically significant group."2
If variations in total economic activity are measured in terms of
changes in real GNP, a question arises: Whatthe relationship of
such statistical indicators to GNP? A theoretical link of some of these
series to GNP can be established. But, in other cases, the relation-
ship is either tenuous or farfetched.3
Daly acknowledges that the historical conformity to the business
cycle is not sufficient ground to instil confidence in the use of statistical
indicators as a forecasting device, and he refers to both positions: the
criticism of the inadequacy of a theoretical framework by
Koopmans), and the defense (e.g., by Vining). Daly claims that "the
work since the late 1950's has. been much more about the
economic rationale" and he appears to suggest that the work speaks
'He also mentions another method, the "amplitude-adjusted"compositeipdexes
7).
2Business Cycles and Forecasting, byE. C. Bratt. Homewood, IllinoIs, Richard
Irwin,Inc., 1961,390.
Bratt makes a good case for the economic ratIonale Of most series included among
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for itself as an answer to "the critics and sceptics" (p. 1161). One
cannot help but wonder whether this is really the case.
Wesley Mitchell was not only a pioneer researcher in this field but
he also had a great feeling about the relationship between business-
cycle analysis and macroeconomic analysis. He commented about the
selection of indicators in their relationship to GNP: "A series that
influences our choice of reference dates appreciably because it is
comprehensive is a series that represents an appreciable fraction of
aggregative activity; its peaks and troughs therefore contribute to
what we are seeking to find —thepeaks and troughs in aggregate activity
itself."4
In using leading indicators as a forecasting device, what is really
being forecast: a change in the direction of economic activity, either
up, recovery or upswing—or down, recession or downswing? If so,
is a change in economic activity to be measured in its most compre-
hensive form, an increase or a decrease in real GNP? If this is the in-
tent, what happens if the leading indicators suggest a possible decline,
but all that happens is the slowdown in the rate of growth of the real
GNP? Daly would say, as would others, that the leading indicators
showed only "weakness," reflecting a "retardation" in economic
growth, such as has occurred in the United States in 1951, 1956, and
1966—67 (p. 1174).
But a slowdown in the rate of economic growth may be accom-
panied by an increase in the number of unemployed and by rising
prices. There are a number of reasons for this. Productivity may rise
and the number of hours worked per week may be up. Hence, fewer
people can produce a greater output. If at the same time the labor
force is growing fairly rapidly, and this has been the North American
experience in recent years, unemployment may rise significantly at the
same time that the GNP continues to expand. And further, there may
be great regional variations, so that a national "above average" unem-
ployment ratio may range all the way from moderately below full em-
ployment to serious unemployment levels which may be socially un-
desirable and politically unacceptable.
What HappensDuring BusinessCycles: A Progress Report, byWesley C. Mitchell,
National Bureau of Economic Research. Cambridge, Mass., The Riverside Press, 1951,
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With unemployment rising, prices may continue to increase. This
may be the case not only because of the customary lag effect, but also
for other reasons—the continuity of cost-push pressures, the result
of the economic power of big business and big unions inadequately
restrained by government policies.
Daly acknowledges that statistical indicators cannot throw much
light on the economic gap, the difference between actual and potential
GNP (p. 1180). It is the under-utilization of manpower (unemployment
and underemployment) and of other resources (physical capital and
natural resources) that contribute to the widening of the economic
gap.
There is another limitation. Though statistical indicators may
serve as an effective forecasting tool in foreseeing a change in the
direction of economic activity, they are only indicative of the symptoms
of change (say business activity), however defined. They do not ex-
plain the fundamental factors contributing to that change. The econ-
omist, however, is not only concerned with finding out what change is
in the offing but also why. For if he he not satisfied with the reasons
explaining the change in economic activity, either up or down, he may
mistrust statistical indicators, treating them as what they are: a me-
chanical tool not to be relied upon without an economic rationale.
Another use to which statistical indicators can be put for forecast-
ing purposes is in throwing some light on the question of "the duration
and extent of current change," a subject that "is not always given
sufficient attention in forecasting appraisals" (p. 1174).
Two suggestions are put forward for further discussion. First,
if statistical indicators are assumed to be closely related to business-
cycle analysis, what happens if countries like the United States and
Canada are in a stage of more or less continuous economic expansion,
such as the period 1961—69, unparalleled in peacetime history for a
century? During these nine years, problems encountered were those of
a temporary slowing down in the rate of economic growth, accom-
panied by rising unemployment and persistent inflationary pressures.
How effective have statistical indicators been in throwing light on the
length of the period of economic expansion, or on the strength and con-
tinuity of the upthrust of wages and prices on a broad front?
Second, if statistical indicators are used to signify changes in1188 ECONOMETRIC MODELS OF CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
over-all economic activity, i.e., variations in the real GNP, either up
or down, do they really provide an adequate tool for assisting govern-
ment to formulate effective economic policies designed to maximize
economic growth and social welfare? The argument here is that they
do not. (This point will be expanded in the conclusions.)
As Lempert explains, indicators are nothing "more than the
product of a particular way of looking at the economy we live in."5
ROLE OF JUDGMENT
"It is a matter of judgment whether a particular decline in the
leaders reflects a pause in the vigor and extent of the expansion, or a
cyclical recession" (p. 1174). This is in part the problem of "false
signajs," and Daly refers to the writings of Alexander, Sachs, and
Okun in elaborating on the hazards the analyst faces in distinguishing
correct from false signals (footnote 40, P. 1182).
The remedy suggested by Daly isinitial caution in regarding
every period of weakness in the leaders as an indicator of cyclical
weakness" (p. 1175).
All good forecasters are cautious. If they are not, they are likely
to get their fingers burnt and their professional reputation tarnished.
But caution is no substitute for judgment; statistical procedures exist
to help in the formulation of judgment, not to substitute for it.
It would be useful if this subject could be pursued at the present
conference. On what should judgment be based when statistical in-
dicators are used as an economic forecasting device? Should the judg-
ment be concerned first with recognizing where the economy stands as
it takes off into the future to be predicted? Would it not be wise to
heed Moore's advice: competent use of statistical indicators would
enable us to "reduce the usual lag in recognizing revivals or reces-
sions that have already begun"?6
"Leading Indicators," by Leonard H. Lempert, in HowBusiness Economists Fore-
cast, W. F. Butler and R. A. Kavesh, eds. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1966, p. 38.
6Statistical Indicators of Cyclical Revivals and Recessions, byGeoffrey H. Moore,
Occasional Paper 31, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1950.FORECASTING WITH STATISTICAL INDICATORS•1189
Shouldjudgment, in the second instance, take account of the
results obtained by other means of forecasting? Should the analyst
wait for such results before formulating his judgment? Other means
might include econometric forecasts; anticipatory surveys; integrated
forecasts within a national accounts framework —supportedby sector,
industrial, and regional outlook appraisals; forecasts within an output-
input framework; and within a financial-flow system.
In considering the results obtained through these other means of
forecasting, the analyst may want to bear in mind that many of the
aggregative measurements, particularly the GNP model, do not lend
themselves to the effective detection of turning points in economic
activity. Recourse must then be taken to sector examination and
statistical indicator analysis as more reliable means of establishing
the finer points of economic change, which may be glossed over in
broad aggregates.
Nonetheless, judgment depends on many other things beside
measurable economic forces. There is the understanding of economic
theory, as well as qualitative considerations. The latter may be eco-
nomic, e.g., possible policy changes; psychological, e.g., consumer or
business attitudes; social, e.g., pressures to aid the underprivileged;
political, e.g., a forthcoming election; and international, e.g., national
responses to changes in the Cold War.
Judgment presumes insight into the workings of the social system
and into the motivations that shape economic behavior. The main
point here is that there is no substitute for good judgment in classifying
and assessing the variables that will exert the greatest influence in a
given situation. This view should not be interpreted as meaning that
the economic forecaster relies largely on intuition. On the contrary,
scientific analysis plays an important part in economic forecasting.
But this scientific approach has to be blended with an understanding of
human motivation and the possibility of both rational and irrational
reaction to given situations. Thus the economic forecaster must not
only be a social scientist, but also a student of human nature, trans-
cending the areas covered by the social sciences.
In this connection, one might recall Bernard Baruch's definition
of judgment. He was asked: "What is the secret of your success at1190 ECONOMETRIC MODELS OF CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
being economic adviser to seven Presidents of the United States?"
He replied: "It's rather simple. People ask my advice because I have
good judgment. Good judgment comes from experience. Experience —
well,that comes from bad judgment."
SEASONAL ADJUSTMENTS
Seasonal adjustments of statistical indicators are "almost taken for
granted by most economists and statisticians" (p. 1162), though Daly
acknowledges the difficulties encountered in obtaining such data "partly
because of the greater extent of irregular factors and special consider-
ations" (p. 1162), and the "imperfections...inthe methods of sea-
sonal adjustments" (p. 1183).
There islittle doubt that deseasonalized series provide better
indications of economic change than do seasonally unadjusted data.
The question is not whether to use adjusted or raw data for forecasting
purposes, but whether seasonal adjustments may create distortions
greater than the shortcomings inherent in the use of unadjusted data.
Some testing has been done in this field, suggesting that deseason-
alization may produce results that go beyond its stated objective, also
bringing about: (1) elimination of components that are not seasonal;
(2) introduction of components that are not seasonal; and (3) distortion
of temporal relations among series.
Larry Klein, in presenting his paper on "Short and Long Run
Simulations of the Wharton Model" at this Conference, made the
point that his investigations showed that the deseasonalized series
introduced new seasonal factors.
Nerlove has examined two methods of seasonal adjustments —the
Bureau of Labor Statistics method and the so-called "residual" method.
He has tested by means of spectral and cross-spectral analysis7 some
75timeseries on employment, unemployment, and labor force (in-
7"In somewhat oversimplified terms the basic idea behind these types of analysis
[spectral and cross-spectral analysis] is that a stochastic time series may be decomposed
into an infinite number of sine and cosine waves with infinitesimal random amplitudes.
Spectral analysis deals with a single time series in terms of its frequency 'content';
cross-spectral analysis deals with the relation between two time series in terms of their
respective frequency 'contents.' ""SpectralAnalysis of Seasonal Adjustment Proce-
dures," by Marc Nerlove, Econornetrica,Vol.32, No. 3, July, 1964, p. 241.FORECASTING WITH STATISTICAL INDICATORS•1191
cludingmany subseries), regularly collected by the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
This examination led Nerlove to two conclusions regarding the
effects of the BLS seasonal-adjustments procedures:
First, these procedures remove far more from the series to
which they are applied than can properly be considered as sea-
sonal. Second, if the relation between two seasonally adjusted
series in time is compared with the corresponding relation be-
tween the original series in time, it is found that there is a dis-
tortion due to the process of seasonal adjustment itself. Both
defects impair the usefulness of the seasonally adjusted series as
indicators of economic conditions, but, of the two, temporal dis-
tortion is the more serious defect.8
In this context, the analyst using statistical indicators for fore-
casting purposes has four choices: (1) he can ask for improvements in
the deseasonalization process to reduce the distortions that apparently
plague presently available adjusted data;9 (2) he can call for more
comprehensive tests of deseasonalization procedures so as to obtain
some quantitative indication of the statistical bias introduced by such
procedures; (3) he can consider the possibility of making increasing
use of raw data in economic analysis, bearing in mind that many busi-
ness decisions are made on the basis of quantitative evidence, unad-
justed for seasonal factors; and (4) he can allow for the defects of
deseasonalized indicators in using them to formulate his economic
forecast. This last may involve —tothe extent that statistical verifica-
tionis incomplete—taking into account qualitative factors in the
formulation of judgment as to the validity, comprehensiveness and
meaningfulness of the data used. If I may make a suggestion to the
Conference Executive Committee: perhaps this subject of problems
faced in deseasonalization may be dealt with at a future conference.
8lbid.
In another paper, Daly stresses the importance of the economic forecaster and the
statistician working more closely together: "Much could be gained from better two-way
communication between economic theorists and short-term forecasters, on the one hand,
and the developers and users of statistical indicators, on the other." "Economic In-
dicators in the 1960's," by D. J. Daly and Derek A. White, ofthe Business
andEconomics Statistics Section,American StatisticalAssociation,August, 1967,
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APPLICATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES
"Most of the work with statistical indicators has been done in the
United States" (p. 1176). This is true. Daly proceeds to refer also to
some work undertaken in this field in Canada, Australia, and Japan
(pp. 1176 and 1177). To round out these references, it might have been
helpful to mention the investigations undertaken in this field by the
Institut für Konjunktur Forschung (Deutsches Institut für Wirt-
schafts Forschung) in Berlin, dating back to the late 1920's; and similar
work undertaken by the .IFO Institut für Wirtschafts Forschung in
Munich, founded in 1949; business-cycle analysis undertaken at the
University of Louvain, particularly the pioneering work of Prof.
L. H. Dupriez since the early 1930's; and the more recent investiga-
tions conducted in France by the SEDES (Seryice des Etudes Eco-
nomiques et Financières), and in the Netherlands by the CPB (Central
Planning Bureau).
CONCLUSIONS
While a great deal of work can be done to reduce the imperfections
of the data and to strengthen the theoretical framework, Daly makes
the point that statistical indicators have earned their honored place in
the arsenal of short-term forecasting techniques and that this has "im-
portant implications for attempts to use economic forecasts as a basis
for discretionary monetary and fiscal policy aimed at the task of eco-
nomic stabilization" (p. 1183).
If one may be permitted to extrapolate what Daly may have in
mind, his thinking appears to run parallel to the views held by Arthur F.
Burns, who took over the chairmanship of the Federal Reserve Board
on January 31, 1970. As former President of the National Bureau of
Economic Research, and close collaborator with Wesley C. Mitchell,
Burns looks with some favor at the indicator approach to economic
forecasting.
As a former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers,
Burns is also mindful of the limitations of short-term forecasting as
an effective means of guiding economic policy, and he holds that "fineFORECASTING WITH STATISTICAL INDICATORS•1193
tuning"of the economy—that is, rapid changes in economic policy,
quick turns to expansion followed by equally rapid turnaround toward
deflation —isnot workable in an economy like that of the United States.
Applying this position to the workings of the Federal Reserve Board,
Burns observed: "I think that abrupt shifts by the Federal Reserve
Board have been too frequent in our nation's history. Our monetary
authorities... needto learn how to forecast better" or "recognize that
oscillations of monetary policy may easily prove destabilizing."0
This sounds like Milton Friedman (though Burns might go further
in the use of fiscal and monetary policy instruments than Friedman);
namely, that the Federal Reserve Board should abandon its traditional
position of leaning against prevailing economic winds; that is, tighten-
ing credit when the economy is buoyant and easing it when the econ-
omy is slowing down. Instead, the Federal Reserve Board might
usefully concentrate on keeping money supply—defined as currency
demand and time deposits in commercial banks—growing at a given
rate.
Whether or not Daly subscribes to the thinking of Burns and
Friedman,11 the fact remains that the use of statistical indicators as a
short-term forecasting device, and the effect of such economic forecast
on fiscal and monetary policy formulation in the United States, will
depend to some extent on whether this country moves away from the
Keynesian compensatory policy approach, as typified by the thinking
of Walter W. Heller when he was Chairman of the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers (and reflected to some extent in the policy guidance
given to the Federal Reserve Board by W. M. Martin, Jr., Chairman
of the Board since 1951), and toward views similar to those advanced
by Burns and Friedman.
For, if "fine tuning" ceases to be a policy objective, fiscal and
monetary policies be subject to less frequent and less extensive
changes than they have been in the recent past. in fact, recognition
appears to be growing, both in the United States and in Canada, that
there are limitations to fiscal and monetary policies in dealing with
'°"HowBurns Will Change the Fed," BusinessWeek, October25,1969,p. 104.
1tThe reference to "...itmay be questioned whether such policy adjustments
would be as necessary in the first place if different fiscal and monetary strategies were
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some of the problems of economic growth—particularly, strong infla-
tionary pressures which persist notwithstanding increasingly tougher
anti-inflationary measures taken by the governments of our two
countries. Voluntary wage and price guidelines have been resorted
to. Consideration is also being given to what governments could do
should measures of voluntary restraint prove ineffective in the private
sector.
In this area, policy thinking in Canada appears to be somewhat
ahead of that in the United States. Only recently, the Canadian Prime
Minister said in the House of Commons:
1 must say, we are determined to continue the fight against
inflation by every means available to government....Amongthe
less voluntary measures, we include, of course, fiscal and mone-
tary policies, but the matter of price controlis something that
the government is considering....Ifnecessary, we will discuss
the problem with the provinces to see whether, if needed, price
and wage controls can be introduced.'2
Both countries appear to be moving in the direction of expanding
government activities —wideningthe range of policy measures to deal
with the excesses of economic growth (e.g., inflation, industrial concen-
tration, and conglomerates) and its deficiencies (e.g., regional ine-
quality and poverty). As this trend toward wider government partici-
pation in economic affairs continues, it will not suffice for economic
forecasting to serve merely as "a basis for discretionary monetary
and fiscal policy aimed at the task of economic stabilization."
Rather, economic forecasting may be required to serve the broader
policy objectives pursued by governments: to expand economic
activity at a rate which makes effective use of the nation's growing
total resources—human, physical, and natural—to the degree that the
public is willing to exchange work for leisure; and to spread the
benefits from gainful pursuits equitably and widely among the members
of society.
12Statementby the Hon. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Houseof Commons Debates,
Queen'sPrinter, Ottawa, October 28, 1969, p. 159.FORECASTING WITH STATISTICAL INDICATORS•1195
HERMAN I. LIEBLJNG
U.S.TREASURY DEPARTMENT
I found little to disagree with in Daly's acceptance of the statistical
indicators as one convenient way of looking at data to provide, at
least in part, the basis for a forecast of economic activity. There is an
air of restrained enthusiasm about this scholarly presentation, but I
assume that thisreflects academic caution (reinforced by Daly's
government experience). He does note, in passing, his need to utilize
other approaches when he was a government forecaster. As a fore-
caster of economic developments for the U.S. Treasury, 1 deeply
sympathize with Daly's quite evident judgment that dependence on
a single framework increases theprobability of error and that pluralism
(or eclecticism)is preferable because it bespeaks a well-merited
humility concerning the attainments of economic science in this area.
More important, Daly's main thrust differs from that of the pro-
tagonists of the indicators approach a decade or so ago. These argu-
ments of the late 1950's were couched in terms of the emergence of a
new and powerful device which might replace other forecasting
techniques. A decade later, Daly repeats the advantages of the
indicators approach (which are by now well-known and generally
accepted by all except the irreconcilable dogmatists). Consequently,
Iwill not resurrect the controversies of that time, as Daly does.
Had I written his paper, I would have preferred discussion of
current issues and prospects relating to the indicators in the following
areas: (1) What progress has been made in the statistical basis of the
indicators since the late 1950's, and to what extent has it improved
the ability to forecast? (2) Are therelimits to further refinement of
the classification process of "leaders," "coinciders," and "laggers"?
(3) Is there a theoretical framework toward which the statistical-
indicators approach is a prior stage, and if so, what might its nature
be? (4) What has been the forecasting record of the statistical indi-
cators? (Surely a topic of prime concern at this Conference...
Obviously,within the framework of time and space that a dis-
cussant may properly use here, no comprehensive discussion of these
topics can be attempted. I would propose that they be the subject, at
least in part, of another income Conference. My present observations1196 ECONOMETRIC MODELS OF CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
should be regarded as outlining what these issues might be, rather
than as providing a rounded treatment of the subject.
STATISTICAL PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENT
Focusing on the 1950's, Daly fails to provide an account of the
advances which have been made over the past decade. Chalk up as
important progress (as Daly notes) the adoption of systems of statis-
tical indicators in many countries. Except for those who are theoretical
monists, I would think this is a noncontroversial advance. Secondly,
since the late 1950's, or early 1960's, various of the statistical indicator
measures have been refined, improving their utility. Early in the decade
(1961), Julius Shiskin published a major work, Signals of Recession
and Recovery, which provided important progress in making available
"amplitude-adjusted" indexes. Possibly that work ought to be credited
as a product of the 1950's.
To the 1960's, I credit Shiskin's development of the so-called
reverse-trend adjusted index of the leading indicators. The re-
mainder of the work of the 1960's in the statistical-indicators field
appears to consist of statistical refinement— notably, the revisions in
the list of indicators and the ingeniously derived statistical measures
combining existing statistics (e.g., price per unit of manufacturing
labor cost; contracts and orders for plant and equipment). Also of
this statistical nature was the scoring system for the reliability of the
indicators.' Finally, the availability of Business Conditions Digest
(under the direction of Shiskin) on such a current and comprehensive
basis must be considered an important asset to forecasters. If I have
omitted some additional achievements, they have not yet appeared
in BCD. Of the improvements just listed, I would single out Shiskin's
reverse-trend adjustment as the major development in improving the
ability to forecast. In the amplitude-adjusted form, the index of the
leading indicators showed a variable lag of from six to twenty months
decline prior to the four postwar expansion peaks. The reverse-trend
'Indicators of Business Expansions and Contractions, Geoffrey Moore and Julius
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adjustment, which makes allowance for secular trends in the economy,
has reduced this lag to four to seven months.2
SCOPE OF FURTHER RESEARCH
The issue I would raise is the establishment of ongoing research
of a conceptual nature, directed toward further development of the
statistical indicators. In their latest major book (1967), Moore and
Shiskin raise the question of what "improvements take place when a
revised list of National Bureau indicators is released."3 They conclude
that the indexes of change in the postwar period "based upon the 1966
list are virtually the same as the corresponding indexes based upon the
1960 list. This reflects the fact that, on an over-all basis, the new and
old lists have many common elements." Apparently, this phase of
research needs little further work.
New research effort would appear to require some larger frame-
work of analysis, one going beyond the classification of "leaders,"
"coinciders," and "laggers." If such exists, its main outlines are
obscure or, perhaps, unannounced. Thus, Daly is one phase behind in
his defense of the indicators; the dust has settled on the old contro-
versies. At this point, I raise the question: Now that the statistical
indicators system has been developed, where do we go from here?
In his description of "the complete system" (p. 1165), Daly has
suggested the need for such a theoretical framework, which would
include as its essential elements: (1) the key role of profits in business
decision-making; (2) the importance of lags in response; and (3) the
role of uncertainty. These are important aspects of W. C. Mitchell's
view of the business cycle. Perhaps Daly does have some special— not
yet revealed —mannerin which the statistical-indicators approach is
uniquely related to these elements. Recently, a vast literature has
been published in each of these areas, as much connected with large-
scale econometric models, or anticipations surveys, as with the
indicators. Since it is processes on which W. C. Mitchell would have
2 ofEconomics and Statistics, February, 1968.
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liked us to focus, I would submit that the Jorgenson-Eisner articles on
profits, the distributed-lag relationships developed by Koyck and
Almond, and the Milton Friedman work on uncertainty, bear a close
relation to the comprehension of processes in any framework. Daly
does not state how these works are to be integrated into the framework
of the statistical indicators. More generally, the question is: How can
statistical indicators be organized to accommodate the complete
system?
In this connection, I shall briefly note that another type of statis-
tical indicator has emerged to claim recognition as the best way to
forecast. Dr. Arthur Burns, armed though he has been with statistical
indicators and other methods of forecasting, recently warned how poor
our forecasts have been (as discussed below). Indeed, the recent work
of Leonall Andersen, and others working in the spirit of the so-called
monetarist school, points to a new type of statistical indicator, appar-
ently possessing strong predictive power. We are confronted with
this problem: If we desire to work with a new framework of analysis
of an indicator type, will it be one which concentrates on the monetary
variables? Will it be intended to supplement or replace the older
indicators approach? If the monetarists are right in stating that money
discipline is inescapable in its economic consequences, what place do
the nonmonetary indicators have? An unpublished paper by Moore
and Shiskin addresses itself to these questions. I hope it will soon
find its way into print.
THE FORECASTING RECORD
At an earlier Income Conference it was observed that many who
are well equipped with information and techniques cannot produce
sound forecasts.4 Since that time (September, 1951), considerable
work has been invested in developing large-scale econometric models.
NOnetheless the observation just introduced remains valid. Econo-
metric models used for forecasting in the earlier post-World War II
period failed. Thus, there is an air of deja vue hanging over these
4Short-Term Forecasting, Studies in income and Wealth, Vol. 17. New York,
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Proceedings.Apparently there is no substitute for judgment, balance,
and insight in making economic forecasts; econometrics is merely the
first of many steps.
At no time was this more aptly illustrated than at the recent
critical juncture of mid-1968, when economic policy of the U.S. was
misdirected toward economic "overkill" subsequent to June 1968,
because all large-scale econometric models advised the same. It may be
useful to compare those forecasts with other methods, such as the
indicators approach. After all, theoretical deficiencies abound. And,
if the indicators method proves itself without such encumbrances, it
surely deserves attention. Indeed, that period appears to be the finest
hourfor the indicatorsapproach in. recent years.
Now, I did not follow that procedure myself in advising the
Treasury that "overkill" was not a danger—mine was a solitary voice
forecasting that the policy measures were not restrictive enough!
I do use a small econometric model, but only as a first step, and I
also look at the indicators. The comparison of the forecasts in the
table with the information in the chart shows that the indicators
approach performed creditably.
The chart shows that the summary measure of the leading indi-
cators—the so-called reverse-trend adjusted index—was signaling
continued economic expansion during 1968. The index accelerated in
pace, pointing to considerable expansion of over-all activity during
that period and into the first half of 1969. As a useful summary of
measures foretelling economic activity, it served an important purpose.
On the other hand, the total index was more reliable than its parts.
The latter are not reverse-trend adjusted. As the chart shows, the
marginal employment adjustment series remained fairly flat. Accord-
ingly, this part of any analysis using the indicators must be interpreted
much differently at periods of high employment than at other times.
Similar is the confusing signal generated by the profitability series,
which remained quite flat during 1968. During most of 1968, the in-
ventory investment series clearly lagged, rather than leading. In view
of the expansion which did take place, most striking of all was the flat
performance ot the sensitive financial flows (using measures favored
by the monetarists). Only the capital investment commitment series





































SOURCE: BusinessConditions Digest, Bureau of Census, U.S. Department
of Commerce.
aReversetrend-adjusted index of twelve leaders contains the same trend as
the index of five coincident indicators.
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confessthat I am uncertain about the significance of this performance.)
The accurate findings of the reverse-trend adjusted index, showing
a strong "plus" on the course of future economic activity, is an accom-
plishment worth noting, especially as compared with other forecasts of
a more intricate and theoretical nature. The table shows the economic
forecasts for 1969 made before the Joint Economic Committee in Feb-
ruary, 1969, seven months after the forecasts of economic "overkill"
had originally been made. (During this period unreprentance prevailed.)
Instead of the strong "plus," all forecasters at these hearings per-
formed badly, as compared with the message relayed by the indicators.
Until recently, the indicators method did not provide means of
quantification of how strong or how weak future economic activity, as
measured by GNP, might become. Geoffrey Moore has provided a
bridge connecting the two approaches.5 More attention should be
given to a structural link between. the statistical indicators and a
forecast of GNP. Grateful as we are for a forecast of the correct sign
of the future course of economic activity, it would be even more
meaningful if, by the use of the "leading indicators," a given volume
of GNP might be projected, from which the structural elements of
the income and product sides could be separated out by subsequent
analysis.
Using Moore's regression analysis of annual per cent changes in
the index of leading indicators and in the gross national the
forecast GNP for 1969 over 1968 was calculated, employing the infor-
mation available at the turn of 1968. This method forecast an advance
of $62 billion, or 7.2 per cent. In contrast, most of the forecasts show
GNP increases centering around $55 billion or so. Moore's forecast
was the highest, about the same as that of George Perry. Nevertheless,
the humility which most of these forecasters ought to share is apparent
when we compare their figures with a 1969 GNP change of around $67
billion, or over 7.5 per cent. My own views on how these econometric
models failed, and why they did, are set forth in an article published
in the 1969 Proceedings of the American Statistical Association,
Business and Economics Section.
Daly indicates no particular preference in his forecasting methods,
5Geoffrey H. Moore, "Forecasting Short-Term Economic Change," Journalof the
American Statistical Association, March,1969.Selected Economic
1968 1969
Actual Actual
Source of Data IV I (I hIp
Change in GNP, Billions of
Dollars
The Wharton School 16.1 16.2 16.1 17.5
University of Michigan 16.1 16.2 16.1 17.5
UCLA 16.1 16.2 16.1 17.5
George Perry (University of
Minnesota) 16.1 16.2 16.1 17.5
Federal Reserve Policy Model16.1 16.2 16.1 17.5
Economic Report of the
President 16.1 16.2 16.1 17.5
Geoffrey Moore Model 16.1 16.2 16.1 17.5
Per Cent Change in Deflator
at.An.nual Rates
The Wharton School 4.3 4.9 5.2 5.4
University of Michigan 4.3 4.9 5.2 5.4
UC.LA 4.3 4.9 5.2 5.4
George Perry (University of
Minnesota) 4.3 4.9 5.2 5.4
Federal Reserve Policy Model 4.3 4.9 5.2 5.4
Economic Report of the
President 4.3 4.9 5.2 5.4
Geoffrey Moore Model 4.3 4.9 5.2 5.4
Per Cent Change in Real GIVP
at Annual Rates
The Wharton School 3.2 2.6 2.0 2. 1
University of Michigan 3.2 2.6 2.0 2.1
UCLA 3.2 2.6 2.0 2.1
George Perry (University of
Minnesota) 3.2 2.6 2.0 2.1
Federal Reserve Policy Model 3.2 2.6 2.0 2.1
Economic Report of the
President 3.2 2.6 2.0 2.1
Geoffrey Moore Model 3.2 2.6 2.0 2.1
NOTE: p: preliminary; n.a.: not available.
SOURCE: Moore Model projection derived from equation relating percent-
age changes in GNP to percentage changes in twelve leading indicators, using










9.5 12.7 13.9 55.3 59 79 79
10.0 8.7 17.9 54.3 62 54 102
11.2 12.5 17.5 60.3 69 78 100
n.a. n.a. n.a. 62.0 n.a. n.a. ri.a.
121/2 a n.a. 58—60 ...77 a n.a.
12 a n.a. 60.0 74 a n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a. 61.8 n.a. n.a. n.a.
4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 82 77 74
3.3 3.3 4.5 3.6 67 63 83
3.3 3.3 3.9 3.5 67 63 72
n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a. 3_31/2b n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a. 31/2a n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
0.4 1.7 2.1 2.4 15 85 100
1.3 0.7 3.4 2.6 50 35 162
1.7 2.3 3.9 65 115 186
n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2 a n.a. 2—3 ...,87 a n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a. 3j/2a n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n;a. n.a. n.a.
ciation, March, 1969, P. 16. Other projections from Hearings before the Joint
Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 1969.
a Annual increases and half-year average of quarterly rates derived from
published statements.
b Excludes effects of the federalpay raise in the third quarter.1204 ECONOMETRIC MODELS OF CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
an attitude which I find completely acceptable. However, he might
have stressed that in his former work as a forecaster for the Canadian
Government, he could not avoid going beyond the statistical indicators
in order to forecast tax receipts, for which he would be compelled to
use the framework of national income accounts as well.
REPLY
DALY
Dr..Liebling and Dr. Firestone made a number of useful additions
and suggestions in their comments and raised a number of important
questions. My reply will recapitulate some of the key themes in my
paper and speculate on some of the bigger questions raised by the
discussants.
First of all, let me recapitulate the highlights of my appraisal of
statistical indicators for short-term forecasting— (a) Statistical indi-
cators are an inexpensive forecasting device designed to throw light
on short-term changes for the total economy. (b)Iwould regard them
as necessary but not sufficient to deal with all the areas about which
one would like information and judgments—even in the short-term.
(c) Central to the theoretical rationale present in the indicator approach
is the role of lags and differences in timing relationships in parts of
the system; the role of uncertainty associated with major shocks (from
exogenous policy variables or international developments); and ran-
dom disturbances (deviations from cyclical conformity for specific
cycles); as well as the important role played by prices, profits, costs,
and productivity in the recurrent cyclical process. These central
elements are present in various forms in every single model discussed
at this Conference; I would not regard them as unique to the National
Bureau Model. In the light of their importance in both theory and
practice, they should be incorporated into other systems, also.
A number of significant questions raised by the discussants merit
fuller discussion than can be given here, but some brief comments
seem appropriate:FORECASTING WITH STATISTICAL INDICATORS •1205
1. Are business-cycle indicators an outdated form of economic
analysis? Dr. Firestone raises this question and suggests that I do
not take sides on this issue. One of the tests of any forecasting method
is how well it does outside the period on which the selection of indi-
cators or estimation of relationships was based. The duplication of
the U.S. series from Moore's 1950 paper has caught all the cycles in
Canada from 1953 to date. Dr. Liebling used Moore's regression
analysis of annual per cent changes in the index of leading indicators
to forecast GNP for 1969. This procedure gave a better guide to
subsequent developments than did most of the other forecasts pre-
sented at the Joint Economic Committee in February, 1969. A number
of the appraisals of the models brought forth at this conference suggest
that they have not done well at other key periods, either. Furthermore,
a number of them did not even reproduce all the cycles during the
period for which they were estimated. These appraisals suggest that
the econometric models do not do as well as I, or the builders of the
models, would like. The evidence and discussion at the Conference has
strengthened my conclusion that business-cycle indicators are not
outdated.
2.Are business-cycle indicators self-sufficient? Both Firestone
and Liebling raise this question, and we would all agree that they are
not. I have always used the indicators as a basis for appraising the
direction and vigor of aggregative change for the year ahead, and have
then followed the indicators on a current basis to see if subsequent
developments were in line with expectations. The mode of presentation
adopted was a more complete form of national accounts, prices,
employment, tax collections, trade, and balance of payments. Invest-
ment surveys, government expenditure forecasts, and other sources
of information were used, and an econometric model initiated by L. R.
Klein in 1947 was also employed. There would be a wide area of agree-
ment on the need to use all these tools in forecasting. The indicators
were particularly helpful for the over-all change, and for some evidence
on the cyclically sensitive areas, such as profits and inventory change,
not usually well handled in other approaches.
There are some things that the indicators were clearly not designed
to do. They emphasize the short-term and do not help on long-term
projections. Furthermore, they are aggregative, and were not designed1206 ECONOMETRICMODELS OF CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
to provide forecasts of industrial and regional detail, or to indicate
whether wage and price controls are necessary or desirable. Critical
in good judgment is a knowledge of the tools appropriate for particular
problems. It would be poor judgment for me, or anyone else, to claim
that the indicators can cope with all problems.
There is, however, one further area in which I should like to
register my dissent. Dr. Firestone raises some questions about sea-
sonal adjustment. One possibility he suggests is the use of raw data,
noting that many business decisions are made on this basis. It is true,
unfortunately, that many business firms—even large ones—use un-
adjusted data. That is why their views about short-term developments
and the short-term outlook are so frequently unsatisfactory. The
procedure chosen accentuates the short-term inventory cycle and
contributes to the lack of reliability of short-term business expecta-
tions.1 Nerlove's tests (which Firestone relies on) concentrated on the
BLS method. More recent Census seasonal adjustment methods have
reduced the sensitivity in the later years of the series, and the results
would now be less vulnerable to Nerlove's tests than the method which
he tested. I would very strongly advise against the use of raw data
for short-term analysis.
3. What implications do our forecasting results have for discre-
tionary stabilization policies? Dr. Firestone raises this question at
the end of his comments, and I will attempt a condensed reply, even
though the subject really needs a book, rather than a few brief para-
graphs. What would happen if one were to run the estimated econo-
metric models for the postwar period with a stable rate of growth in
the money supply, stable growth in real government expenditures, and
a balanced budget at full employment? I would expect greater stability
would result than the United States has actually enjoyed. The cutback
in defense expenditures in early 1953 had an important effect on the
1953—54 recession—the one that all the models caught—while changes
in policy frequently increased, rather than reduced, instability.
The simulations of the model systems presented at this Con-
ference and my appraisal of the indicator framework both emphasize
that the economy has a fairly stable system, with important lags and
1Fora fuller discussion of this view see D. J. Daly, "Seasonal Variations and Business
Expectations," Journalof Business, July, 1959, pp.258—270.FORECASTING WITH STATISTICAL INDICATORS•1207
considerable uncertainty. The North American economy has been
stable over the postwar period inspite of—rather than because
of— discretionary policy. Korea and Vietnam have contributed to
changes in defense expenditures and there have been wide variations
in monetary policy.
To operate discretionary policy effectively, it is important to be
able to forecast an extended period ahead with accuracy, taking
cognizance of the evidence on the length of all the internal and external
lags, in both monetary and fiscal policy. Until we know more about the
lags in response to policy and can forecast farther ahead with more
assurance, I confess my growing sympathy with the use of rules. (This
reflects a shift in my views since the late 1950's.) The papers presented
at this Conference provide additional evidence that the forecasting
methods and the forecasters are still experiencing real difficulties in
passing the tests on forecasting. This state of affairs offers further
evidence against the feasibility of attempting short-term stabilization
on a discretionary basis.